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Walker (1996) presents a cache model of the operation of attention in the processing of discourse 
as an alternative  to the focus space stack that  was proposed previously by Grosz and Sidner 
(Grosz 1977a; Grosz and Sidner 1986). In this squib, we present a critical analysis  of the cache 
model and of Walker's supporting evidence from anaphora in discourses with interruptions and 
from informationally  redundant utterances.  We argue that the cache model is underdetermined 
in several ways that are crucial to a comparison of the two models and conclude that Walker has 
not established the superiority of the cache model. We also argue that psycholinguistic evidence 
does not support the cache model over the focus stack model. 
1. Introduction 
Attention constrains the  structure  and  processing of discourse.  This  fact has been 
important to computational research on discourse since the work of Grosz (1977b). 
A  recent article by Walker (1996) argues that the attentional mechanism has limited 
capacity, that this limited capacity determines the accessibility of information in dis- 
course processing, and that certain linguistic behavior can only be explained in terms 
of this limited capacity. Walker presents  as  an alternative to the focus space  stack 
previously proposed to model global attentional state (Grosz 1977a; Grosz and Sidner 
1986) a cache model in which linear recency and a highly constrained cache capacity 
play primary roles. As critical evidence, Walker presents an analysis of anaphora in 
discourses with interruptions and of informationally redundant utterances (IRUs).  In 
addition, she cites psychological evidence on the limited capacity of human informa- 
tion processing. In this response, we discuss the relationship between the focus-space 
stack model and the cache model, examine Walker's evidence with respect to the two 
models, and review psychological evidence concerning the contributions of limited 
capacity and recency to the understanding of discourse. We identify problems with 
Walker's analysis and deficiencies in the cache model. 
2. Attentional  State, Focus, and Limited Capacity 
Walker argues that "[t]he notion of a  cache in combination with main memory, as is 
standard in computational  architectures,  is a good basis for a computational model of hu- 
man attentional capacity in discourse processing (emphasis added)" (page 258). Walker 
further claims that this model has advantages in explaining discourse phenomena over 
what she refers to as the "stack model." 
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Within computer systems, the  stack  and  cache  address  different concerns and 
levels  of processing.  The  stack model draws  on ideas  in  programming languages 
that work on evaluation of variables. The cache model is based on work on mem- 
ory management. To examine Walker's claims, we first identify those features of each 
computational construct that play a role in the respective discourse models. 
The use of a focus space stack as a model of global attentional state for discourse 
processing (Grosz 1977b) drew on the use of stacks by programming language inter- 
preters and compilers to determine variable values. In interpreters and compilers, the 
stack determines the value a  variable has when a  processor is in a  certain state.  It 
provides implicit indexing and an ordering of access to values that is dependent on 
context. These two properties and the stack's ability to capture hierarchical relation- 
ships are the primary attributes adopted in the stack-based model of global discourse 
structure and processing. 
Because Walker describes the cache model only generally and does not identify 
specific properties of caches that are relevant to her model, we first establish the basic 
roles of caches in computer systems and then identify those properties that seem most 
relevant to her claims. In computer systems architectures, the cache and main memory 
are elements of the memory hierarchy, each level of which has a different speed, size, 
and cost. Faster memory is "closer" to the processor allowing for quicker processing 
of information stored there. The term "cache" primarily refers to the smallest, fastest 
memory that is accessed first. Because the whole point of the cache is to speed up 
processing, cache management algorithms must be low cost. They are syntactic in the 
extreme, depending on physical properties of the system and making no reference to 
content. For discourse-processing algorithms, and for Walker's model, similar phys- 
ical properties of human memory do not seem the issue and content (semantic and 
pragmatic) does matter. 
Only two of the central memory-hierarchy questions for computer architectures 
(Patterson and Hennessy 1996) are relevant to the discourse issues Walker raises: re- 
placement strategy and how information is found in the cache. Walker does not spec- 
ify a replacement strategy, but suggests consideration of a modification of the "least 
recently used" strategy that accommodates what she  calls  "preferential retention." 
Preferential retention is not clearly defined in the squib; we are given no details on 
how items to be (preferentially) retained are identified nor on differences in treatment 
of retained items and those in the cache on some other basis.  Preferential retention 
is said to depend on the intentions of the discourse participants, but exactly how is 
not specified. There is no discussion of how to identify the information relevant to a 
new intention that should be retained. Because intention-based preferential retention 
seems to be the main way Walker's cache model breaks out of a strict linear-recency 
approach, the lack of detail makes it difficult to ascertain exactly how it works, and 
more generally to establish how the model differs from the stack model. 
Walker does not discuss methods for searching the cache although issues of locat- 
ing information in the cache are important in computer systems design. Instead, the 
cache model assumes the cache is sufficiently limited in size that everything in it is 
"almost instantaneously accessible" (Walker 1996, 258). Walker also does not define 
"strategically retrieve" nor specify how main memory is searched when items are not 
found in the cache. Because main memory is part of the cache model (see the quotation 
that starts this section), without such information it is difficult to evaluate the model. 
Hence, the main claims of the cache model seem to be that (1) the cache contains 
a small number of items; (2) as new entities are discussed in the discourse, entities not 
mentioned recently are removed from the cache to make room, and (3) remention and 
some (unspecified) connection with the current discourse intention cause an entity to 
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be retained longer in the cache than it would otherwise be. An important related claim 
is that (4) only items in the cache are available for various discourse processes like the 
inference of discourse relations (Walker 1996, 258). 
Linear recency thus plays a much more substantial role in the cache model than 
in the stack model. In this context, claim (1) raises both computational and linguistic 
issues. From a  computational point of view, the cache must be small enough to al- 
low for instant retrieval of all items (or Walker must specify the retrieval part of the 
processing); from the linguistic point of view, the cache size must accommodate the 
facts of informationally redundant utterances--being small enough to explain when 
an IRU is required and large enough to explain when no IRU is needed. 
The stack model makes specific claims about how intentions at the discourse level 
affect attentional state, providing the basis for the hierarchical structure. With respect 
to (3), Walker says that such intentions influence retention and retrieval in the cache 
model, but no details are given. Intentional connections might be identified and func- 
tion identically to the intentional structure in the stack model (which would certainly 
greatly lessen the differences between the two models) or differently (in which case 
comparison would shed light on the appropriateness of the different models). An ad- 
ditional difference between the models is the cache model claim (4). The stack model 
claims only differences in speed and complexity of accessibility, not possibility of ac- 
cessibility, among those items in the stack and those not. 
3. Linguistic Evidence 
In her squib, Walker discusses two types of linguistic evidence: pronominal reference 
following interruptions and informationally redundant utterances. We first examine 
this evidence from the stack model perspective showing how the data might be ac- 
counted for within that model; we then raise some questions about Walker's cache 
model explanations. 
In earlier work  (Grosz  1977a; Grosz  and  Sidner  1986) we have  argued  that it 
is important to distinguish between two levels of discourse structure and processing: 
global and local. A focus-space stack was proposed as a model for the global level. The 
main claims about its use in processing have been for handling definite descriptions 
(Grosz 1977a; Grosz 1981) and reasoning about intentional structure (Lochbaum 1998). 
The local level "refers to the influence of a listener's memory for the linguistic form 
of an utterance (the actual words and the syntactic structure) on his interpretation of 
a subsequent utterance" (Grosz 1977b).  1 
According to this theory of discourse structure, pronominal reference depends on 
the local level of attentional state, not the global level. Initial work on hierarchical 
discourse structure was motivated by examples of pronouns that were used to re- 
fer to entities in stacked focus spaces.  This work could be  read as  suggesting that 
some memory for local attentional state was attached to each focus space. However, 
such an account would contradict the local nature of local attentional state, and we 
have more recently denied it (Grosz and Sidner 1997). A more satisfactory explana- 
tion of such pronoun uses has two components: specification of the information that 
indicates a shift in focus back to the attentional state of some previous discourse seg- 
ment (typically more than an unstressed pronoun alone) and a  determination of the 
1 Sidner (1979) first provided algorithms  that tied the local level with pronominal  reference. In 
subsequent work we have defined  a centering  model  for attentional  state at this level (Grosz, Joshi, and 
Weinstein 1995) and have explored the ways in which pronominal  reference  and centering 
interact (Gordon, Grosz, and Gilliom  1993, interalia). 
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possible connections between discourse segment purposes and the entities for which 
such pronoun uses are felicitous (which, we conjecture, should be close connections). 
Although such pronoun uses provide compelling evidence of the hierarchical nature 
of discourse structure, the focus space stack in itself is not sufficient to explain their 
interpretation. 
The claim of centering theory is not that centering alone suffices for resolving all 
pronominal reference (see Kehler [1997]), but that when attentional state plays a role, 
it is local, not global attentional state. This distinction is important as we reexamine 
Walker's data and claims. 
The stack model requires that a  speaker indicate to a  hearer when attention is 
shifting from one discourse intention, and thus segment, to another. As a  result of 
such shifts, focus spaces may be "pushed" or "popped." Typically, isolated references 
alone  (i.e.,  individual pronouns or  definite descriptions)  do  not suffice. Many dif- 
ferent cues have been discussed in the literature, including cue phrases (Hirschberg 
and Litman 1993; Sidner  1981), intonation (Grosz  and Hirschberg 1992; Hirschberg 
and Litman 1993; Nakatani 1997), repetition of previous content (Sidner 1979), and 
tense (Polanyi 1988). With this in mind, we can examine dialogues A-C in Walker's 
squib. 
In comparing dialogues A  and B, Walker argues that the utterance "as well as 
her uh husband" is easy to interpret after a  short interruption but more difficult to 
interpret after a  longer interruption.  2 She  claims that this argues against the stack 
model because the length of the interruption is not a factor in that model. However, 
Walker overlooks the fact that "as well as her uh husband" is a sentence fragment, and 
thus depends on local attentional state for its interpretation. It may be this aspect of the 
utterance rather than the pronoun that makes interpretation difficult. The alternative 
continuation utterance, "OK, well, her husband also works" seems much easier to 
interpret for both versions A and B. 
Walker uses dialogue C to support her argument that IRUs provide evidence for 
linear recency. The gist of her argument is that the material is repeated because it is 
no longer salient and thus no longer in the cache. However, there are alternative ex- 
planations of the function of this particular IRU, all of which are compatible with the 
stack model. One is that the IRU is being used in part to help identify the discourse 
intention to which attention is returning. That is, rather than identifying information 
in main memory that needs to be  made salient again, the IRU is  a  repetition that 
helps to establish to which part of the dialogue (i.e., which focus space on the stack) 
attention is now returning. In this example, attention is returning not merely to the 
certificates, but to the advisor's diversification argument concerning them. With re- 
spect to this kind of example, the cache and stack models differ in how they find the 
information (by looking in main memory or in the stack), more than in what they do 
once they find it. In either case, the IRU functions to identify the information (dis- 
course segment content and purpose)  to which attention is  returning, i.e.,  to focus 
(for the cache model) or refocus (for the stack model) attention on something previ- 
ously salient. The difference is whether that material is found in main memory or in 
the stack. To determine whether the stack model is appropriate, one would need to 
determine whether other items in the focus space to which attention returns become 
salient. 
2 Intonation plays a  major role in the ease or difficulty with which these spoken dialogues could be 
interpreted. That role must be taken into account for processing claims to be supported. 
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4. Some Deficiencies of the Cache Model 
Although the attentional state model leaves certain details unspecified (e.g., as Walker 
notes, the depth of the stack), it makes specific claims about discourse segment struc- 
ture, discourse  segment purposes, and  shifts in attentional state. 3 The cache model, 
as  Walker  presents  it,  leaves  too many  details  unspecified  to  allow  a  similar  level 
of analysis or critique or solid comparison with the stack model. For such purposes 
the memory organization, replacement policy, and retention must be more completely 
specified. Some key questions are: 
Memory organization: What is the structure and organization of main 
memory? According to Walker's cache model if an entity is removed 
from the cache it appears only in main memory and must be retrieved 
from there. Main memory contains a vast amount of information. How 
is the relevant information found? In particular, with an IRU, is the 
information found in the same way on second retrieval as it was ini- 
tially? Is there a claim that long-term memory in some way separates 
out information in the current discourse? In what ways does this struc- 
ture compare to the focus space stack? 
Cache replacement policy: Does only a  single entry get changed for 
each new entity mentioned in the discourse or are entities related to 
the old entry removed and others related to the just-mentioned entity 
added? If such related entities are deleted or added to the cache, which 
semantic or pragmatic properties determine sufficient relatedness? 
Retention:  On  what  specific basis  (e.g., which  particular  discourse- 
intentional  relationships)  are  entities  (preferentially) retained  in  the 
cache? 
5. Some Problems with Walker's Comparison of the Models 
In Section 5 of the squib, Walker compares the stack and cache models along a number 
of dimensions.  Although her description of the effects in the stack model as partic- 
ipants  shift between different discourse  intentions is mostly accurate, the statement 
under  the  second bullet that  entities  in  the  focus space  are  no longer accessible  is 
misleading. These entities are accessible, but access is more complex and less efficient, 
because they are no longer stack-accessible, i.e., they cannot be retrieved through the 
stack. However, they are accessible in memory just as they were before and just as the 
cache model requires for anything removed from the cache. 
More importantly, the cache model is incomplete in ways that are essential to de- 
ciding between the two models. No definition is given of "related to new intention" 
(first bullet) or "related to prior intention" (third bullet). Without these specifications 
it is unclear what material not explicitly mentioned is brought into the cache. A  spec- 
ification of the  cache replacement strategy is  essential  to determining the appropri- 
ateness  of the cache model when intentions are completed (bullet 2).  The statement 
that the cache "retrieves entities related to the prior intention from the main memory 
to the cache, unless retained in the cache," leaves unanswered two critical processing 
3 There are, in addition, several well-recognized problems with the model. In particular, as used in 
computer systems, stacks do not differentiate among different kinds of frames, but interruptions seem 
to operate differently from normal embeddings (Grosz and Sidner 1986) and there are open issues in 
explaining pronominal reference at discourse segment boundaries. 
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questions: (1) How is the cache searched for related entities and how is relatedness 
determined? (2) How is a "prior intention" determined i.e., what memory is there for 
intentional structure and how is that coordinated with information in main memory 
so that the relevant information can be found? The stack model coordinates intentional 
structure and attentional state to address just these issues. 
Walker makes two problematic claims in comparing the two models' treatments of 
interruptions. First, dialogue A differs from dialogue B, in that the interruption in A is 
three utterances long whereas that in B is five utterances. If this difference affects the 
cache content as significantly as Walker's model requires, then the cache is very small; 
it could not accommodate a  very large discourse segment. But then one must ask 
what happens in the cache model with a discourse segment that is longer than three 
or four utterances. Would such a segment require that the reader or writer explicitly 
repeat material that is five or more sentences back? Second, in discussing dialogue C 
Walker says that without (22b),  (22c), and (23) the inference required to understand 
the discourse "requires more effort to process," a claim that requires substantiation; in 
particular, utterance (22a) followed by (24) without the and that is required because of 
(22c) seems no more difficult to process than the fragment given. In both these cases, 
more empirical investigation is needed to determine the appropriate model. 
With respect to return pops, Walker has misconstrued Sidner's stacked focus con- 
straint. This constraint was postulated before Sidner integrated her work on local focus 
of attention with the focus-space stack work. Sidner's claim is significantly different 
from Walker's. In particular, it stipulates which pronouns cannot be used for entities 
other than those locally in focus (i.e., those that we now call centers of an utterance). 
With respect to most of this discussion, Walker does not discuss the potential cost of 
checking nonfocused entities, but this cost can only be low if very few entities are 
checked, not all of long-term memory. In the air compressor (not pump!) example to 
which she refers there was a room full of equipment that could have been made to 
work and that was visually salient. An alternative to the explanations Walker provides 
for the IRUs with return pops is that IRUs are a good way to shift attention to a prior 
discourse intention and segment (hence focus space). 
Finally, we note that the cache model does suggest an interesting research issue 
that is not clearly raised in the stack model. In computer systems, when information is 
moved from main memory to the cache, it is moved in blocks larger than the individual 
piece of information that was initially sought. The guiding locality principle here is 
spatial locality: programs typically need to access information (instructions and data) 
that have addresses near each other in memory (Patterson and Hennessy 1996). The 
processing trade-off that computer designers must address is one of processing time 
versus hit rate:  larger blocks take longer to move, but increase the likelihood that 
subsequently needed information will be in the cache. Implicit focus (Grosz  1977b) 
and the treatment of functionally related entities (Grosz, Joshi, and Weinstein 1995) 
respond to a related issue in discourse processing, namely, what other than an entity 
itself becomes focused when the entity is focused? Although it is widely acknowledged 
that various related entities become  salient  (e.g.,  the  door  of a  house, the time or 
location of a meeting), the determination of the scope of what becomes salient remains 
an open question (Grosz 1981). Whereas computer architects can depend on physical 
proximity in memory, discourse processing requires measures of conceptual closeness. 
6. The Psychology of Discourse Processing 
Like Walker, we support the integration of research in psycholinguistics and research 
in computational linguistics, and we support the contention that human information 
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processing is constrained by capacity limits, a  position that is held by most, but not 
all, cognitive psychologists. However, the psycholinguistic literature does not support 
Walker's  contention that  a  cache in combination with main memory, as is standard 
in computational  architectures,  provides a  good basis for a  computational model of 
human attentional capacity in processing discourse (Walker 1996b).  The modal model 
of memory, capturing common aspects of memory models of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
had a short-term and long-term memory organization resembling cache-main memory 
organization. However, research since then has caused cognitive psychologists to revise 
their views of memory in ways that are not consistent with the idea that a cache-like 
memory contributes to discourse processing. 
The prominent work of Baddeley (1986)  retains the notion of sharply limited ca- 
pacity in working memory, but the component subsystems that have these limitations 
(the articulatory loop and the visual-spatial sketchpad) represent information at levels 
that are not directly useful in discourse processing of the sort with which Walker is 
concerned. Baddeley advances the additional idea of a limited-capacity central exec- 
utive that  controls processing, but for this executive, the appropriate  computational 
analogy is the processor rather  than  the cache or memory. Kintsch's  (1988)  position 
on short-term  memory capacity (articulated  in Kintsch  &  van Dijk  [1978])  depends 
on a  general model of discourse-processing that incorporates many other processing 
assumptions. In fact, Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) report that reducing the capacity of 
the short-term buffer from four propositions to one proposition has no effect on how 
well the discourse-processing model fits human subjects' performance in recalling and 
summarizing  stories. In more recent work, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995)  have argued 
that the amount of information that is required for working memory to perform the 
tasks ascribed to it far exceeds the  capacity of the kinds  of memory stores that  are 
studied using traditional short-term memory tasks. They have proposed that working 
memory makes use of highly organized long-term memory. One source of evidence for 
this view is that frequently people can easily resume a task that has been interrupted, 
a  kind  of evidence that  was also used to motivate  the  original  stack model (Grosz 
1977a).  Walker also cites experimental research on pronoun interpretation  and other 
types of inference in support of her cache model. Clark and Sengul (1979)  is cited in 
support of the notion that pronoun interpretation is based on a linear backward search 
of the text, but this research has been criticized for confounding distance between the 
pronoun and its antecedent with topic shifts (Garnham 1987). Studies of local corefer- 
ence (within discourse segments) clearly show that recency is not the primary factor in 
human pronoun interpretation  (see Gordon and Scearce [1995] for a review). Studies 
of coreference beyond the local domain  (called  "reinstatement"  in the psychological 
literature) do not provide evidence of a powerful effect of recency in determining ease 
of comprehension (O'Brien et al.  1995). Other research cited by Walker does support 
the idea that inference in human language comprehension is constrained, but it does 
not provide a basis for distinguishing  capacity-limited and focus-based approaches to 
this constraint. 
7. Summary 
In sum, we agree with Walker that:  (1) a  model of attentional  state is important  for 
explaining the uses of certain linguistic expressions (e.g., cue phrases and pronouns); 
(2) human mental processes have limitations of both memory and processing. We dis- 
agree with Walker's claims that  (1) limited memory capacity is the key architectural 
feature for attentional state; (2) IRUs should be explained on the basis of this limited 
capacity; (3) the felicity of pronominal processing after an interruption  provides ev- 
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idence of this limited memory capacity; (4)  the psychological literature  supports  the 
cache model. 
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